Schopenhauer’s Theory of the Will by Lewis, Benjamin E.
KU ScholarWorks | The University of Kansas Pre-1923 Dissertations and Theses Collection
Schopenhauer’s Theory of the 
Will
1902
by Benjamin E. Lewis
This work was digitized by the Scholarly Communications program 
staff in the KU Libraries’ Center for Digital Scholarship.
http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu
Submitted to the Department of Philosophy of 
the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
Master t h e s i s 
P h i l , csophy 
Lewis, P.B. 3902 
Schopenhauer's t h e o r y of 
*t> h © w 1 1 JL • 
;-T^*+ S*t 
SCHQFEEIIAUER'g 'THEORY OF THE WILL. 
GRADUATE THESIS 
DEPARTMENT OF "PHILOSOPHY. 
B. E. LEWIS. 
1902, 
Schopenhauer T s Theory of the W i l l . 
i 
Since the days of K a n t , i t has ever "been the ambition of 
modern philosophy to f i n d a r a t i o n a l explanation of the 
world through an analysis of the nature of consciousness. I t 
was Kant who gave t h i s a n a l y s i s to the world. The world i s 
known to us only through the forms of consciousness and i t s 
laws, so the understanding i s the creator of the world d i s -
played around us. I t was the endeavor of Fichte to make the 
moral sentiment the r e a l essence of t h i s consciousness, thus 
making our surrounding world a foundation, a means "by which 
we can develop our own inner l i f e . But Romanticism refused 
to accept the statement that the moral w i l l expressed any 
more thoroughly the r e a l essence of consciousness than any 
other human i n t e r e s t . 
Thus philosophy "became so capricious that not even 
Hegel with h i s pronounced f i n a l i t y was able to stop i t . A 
proper appreciation of t h i s caprioiousness w i l l the b e t t e r 
open up the way f o r Schopenhauer T s system of philosophy i n 
the unfolding of t h i s doctrine?" 
The world of the i d e a l i s t i s made "by himself. The show 
world i s such, "because he has produced i t . I t i s the c r e a t i o n 
of h i s own mind. The outer world has assumed t h i s form "be-
cause of h i s p e c u l i a r s e l f , otherwise i t would "be d i f f e r e n t . 
Hence a r i s e s the question of the r e a l essence of t h i s inner 
s e l f , and' a search f o r i t s deeper nature. Is there anything 
(2) 
stable or f i x e d about t h i s deeper r e a l i t y of mind? I f there 
i s j then I am of necessity compelled to l i v e i n j u s t such a 
world as I do l i v e i n , But, i f i t i s not f i x e d , necessary, 
then i t may change at any moment, and my whole outer world 
may change with i t . 
For ordinary common sense a l l t h i s i s unnecessary. For 
the r e a l i s t there are no misgivings i n regard to the world 
about him. The surrounding objects are things i n themselves 
and f o r themselves alone. I believe they e x i s t and w i l l ex-
i s t whether I do or not. Truth i s there beyond me and i s not 
dependent i n any way upon me f o r i t s r e a l i t y and existence. 
I t i s known to a l l persons of intellegence i n the world-, 
matter-of-fact sense. Yonder i s a tree. For the r e a l i s t i t 
i s as stable and as muoh a r e a l thing as nature can make i t . 
I doesn't i n any way depend upon any form of my consciousness 
f o r i t s existence. I t remains there regardless of anyone's 
knowledge. For i n q u i r i e s about the world the r e a l i s t doesn't 
have to go to the inner sense. 
But, f o r the i d e a l i s t i t i s a personal matter. The ex-
istence of the tree i s wholly subjective. To him, i t i s i n a 
p e c u l i a r sense, h i s t r e e . I t s r e a l i t y and s t a b i l i t y depend 
upon him. Outside of hJun i t does not e x i s t . I percieve the 
same tree only i n so f a r as we have w i t h i n our inner selves 
a common, deeper nature, which gives a true oneness of s p i r i t 
causing us to agree. Hence the tree's remaining permanent 
m 
depends not upon i t s own matter, but upon a'common p r i n c i p l e 
that holds f o r him and myself, and gives i t i t s common outer 
r e a l i t y . 
Since these common ideas are f o r the i d e a l i s t the true 
world, h i s problem i s to f i n d out whether there i s any com-
mon, deeper, and Impersonally human necessity, which requires 
us i n any wise to agree. This, i f i t e x i s t s at a l l must be 
searched f o r i n our own inner nature. I t has ever been the 
e f f o r t of the constructive i d e a l i s t s to f i n d t h i s necessity 
w i t h i n our common r a t i o n a l i t y , which so binds us together 
that we become r e l a t e d parts of one deeper, r e a l existence. 
The f a c t that we percieve the same object i n the same form 
and dimensions, i s possible only because of t h i s Common p r i n -
c i p l e of our l i v e s , which unites us as one and brings to eaoh 
of us the same r e l a t e d outer world of appearance. Therefore, 
t h i s true s e l f , r e a l i t y , l i f e , or what-not,that dwells w i t h i n 
you and also w i t h i n me, makes the green earth a l i k e f o r you 
and f o r me. The t w i n k l i n g stars i n the immensity of space, 
and the mutterings of the storm cloud are our common possess-
ions. 
Says the i d e a l i s t , u n i t y , f i x i t y , assurance, we get, 
i f we get such p r i z e s at a l l , only by v i r t u e of that r a t i o n a l 
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and s p i r i t u a l unity that i s beneath our l i v e s . The problem of 
the philosopher i s to f i n d that common self-hood. I f he i s 
successful i n h i s search f o r t h i s u n i t y , a l l i s united i n one 
U) 
realm of tru t h * 
But to the r e a l i s t , there i s a serious objection at 
t h i s point. The attempt to construct a u n i t y , s p i r i t u a l and 
consistent i n i t s nature, i s unsatisfactory to the common 
mind. No one i s able to deduce from t h i s common s p i r i t u a l 
u nity any p a r t i c u l a t thing of sense. Or why i s i t , or how i s 
i t that we are so l i n k e d together by a common inner p r i n c i p l e 
by which we percieve as one person the multiple objects of 
our outer world. Do they not come to the i d e a l i s t as to the 
r e a l i s t , through experience? Pichte t e l l s us t h i s world of 
sense i s a necessary embodiment for our inner s p i r i t u a l l i f e . 
However t h i s may be, i t i s impossible f o r them to t e l l why 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r sense material alone i s necessary. About the 
only answer the i d e a l i s t can give i s that i t i s the nature 
of t h i s deeper common r a t i o n a l i t y to weave a l i k e for a l l of 
us the p l a i n s , v a l l e y s , mountains, seas, and the stars with 
t h e i r accompanying planetary worlds. 
whether or not there i s a r a t i o n a l i t y running througji i t 
a l l which evolves t h i s material body according to r a t i o n a l 
plans, i t i s impossible to say. Nevertheless, to the common 
mind there i s a capriciousness, an i r r a t i o n a l i t y unexplain-
able about a l l t h i s world of show. But, perhaps, i t i s j u s t 
the nature of t h i s deeper s p i r i t u a l l i f e to be capricious^ 
and so i s i n perfect accord with i t s e l f . The d i f f i c u l t y 
then, says Royce, i s : "Our common s p i r i t u a l nature i s to 
m 
guarantee the t r u t h of our common experience. Unless t h i s 
nature has some hard and f a s t necessity i n i t , of which we 
can form an adequate conception, there i s no s a t i s f a c t i o n i n 
our philosophy. This seeming i r r a t i o n a l i t y i s the great 
question to "be met. 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s p e r p l e x i t y there have a r i s e n upon 
a Kantian "basis numerous systems of philosophy which have 
not only accepted t h i s d i f f i c u l t y hut i n t e n s i f i e d t h i s 
capriciousness, t h i s i r r a t i o n a l i t y i n t h i s common existence, 
a f f i r m i n g t h a t , "Deeper than reason, i n t h i s world of i d e a l 
existence, i s the caprice which once f o r a l l expresses i t s e l f 
5 
i n the wealth of nature fs f a c t s . " 
Of these systems, Schopenhauer1 s i s one of the most 
pronounced, and c l a s s i c representative. Schopenhauer^ 
philosophy has a common s p i r i t u a l o r i g i n with idealism, and 
yet stands i n marked contrast with i t . I t i s i n harmony 
with i t , i n that i t s s o l u t i o n f o r the enigma of existence i s 
wholly subjective; but stands i n bold a n t i t h e s i s to i t i n 
that i t places stress upon the lack of harmony, upon the 
i r r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e of existence. He casts aside t h i s 
established harmony i n a l l existence, ( as h i t h e r t o taught 
by western philosophy and theology), and affirms that "the i n -
nermost kernel of existence i s a b l i n d , u n d i s c i p l i n e d , 
4 
never r e s t i n g , and never s a t i s f i e d want." 
In Schopenhauer T s most notable work, The World as W i l l 
(ft) 
and Idea, he unfolds i n n;reat d e t a i l h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
system. Book I i s a summary of the Kantian basis of Schopen-
hauer's own philosophy. So f a r as subjective i d e a l i s m i s 
concerned, he i s a thorough Kantian. Sensations are merely 
states i n us. Forms of knowledge are property of the subject* 
Things are known to me only as they appear to me. They are 
represented by me by v i r t u e of my i n t e l l e c t . The world i s 
my i d e a . A l l experience may be summed up i n the one word^ 
Idea. This i s made up of two f a c t o r s , subject and object. 
The subject i s unknowable. I t knows a l l things knowable, but 
i t i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n i t s e l f to say that the subject can 
know i t s e l f . Objects, however, are the products of the i n t e l -
l e c t i t s e l f . E e a l i t y i s s o l e l y the work of the understanding, 
o b j e c t i f y i n g the organic a f f e c t i o n s of the body. "No t r u t h 
i s more c e r t a i n , more independent of a l l others, and l e s s i n 
need of proof than t h i s , that a l l that e x i s t s f o r knowledge, 
and t h e r e f o r e , t h i s whole world, i s only object i n r e l a t i o n 
• S 
to subject, perception of a perceiver, i n a word, idea." 
As such, the world as idea has two fundamental, necessary, 
and inseparable halves. One h a l f i s object, the forms of 
which are space and time. The other h a l f i s the subject^ 
which i s outside of space and time, f o r i t i s present, e n t i r e . 
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and undivided i n every p e r c i p i e n t being. When we experience 
anything, we at once a t t r i b u t e i t to some cause i n time and 
space.,When i t i s found, we think of i t as an event produced 
7) 
by some change i n something i n time and space; but these forms 
of space and time and also the p r i n c i p l e of causation are 
also merely formal ideals w i t h i n me. But since causation i s 
j u s t an idea of mine, no cause for, my own experience i s to 
be sought beyond my own true nature. 
Then n a t u r a l l y a r i s e s the question, what i s the r e a l 
nature, the essence, the e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e of t h i s , my 
nature? For, with t h i s purely subjective idealism not even 
Schopenhauer could remain content. We wish to know the 
si g n i f i c a n c e of these ideas. I f t h i s world i s merely idea, 
an empty dream, a baseless v i s i o n , we pass i t by as beneath 
our notice.rBut i s i t not something more than idea, i f so, 
what? One f a c t i s sure, we can never a r r i v e at the r e a l 
nature of things from without. Only images and names reward 
our e f f o r t . "We are l i k e a man who goes round a cas t l e 
seeking i n v a i n f o r an entrance, and sometimes sketching 
7 
the facades." In f a c t , i f the investigator were nothing 
more than pure knowing subject, he would never be able to 
f i n d out what the world as mere idea of the knowing subject 
i s besides. But he himself i s rooted i n that world. He i s an 
i n d i v i d u a l i n i t . His knowledge, as the supporter of the 
f a b r i c of the whole world idea i s always given through a 
body, whose af f e c t i o n s are the s t a r t i n g point for the under-
standing i n the perception of t h i s world. His body i s l i k e 
every other idea, an object among objects. But the movements 
and actions of'his body are j u s t as incomprehensible to him 
(6) 
as the changes i n any other object. But to c a l l these mani-
festations of h i s , body, force, q u a l i t y , or i t s character-
gives no further insight into i t . 
But the inner essence of h i s body i n a l l i t s a c t i v i t i e s 
i s w i l l . This, and t h i s alone, says Schopenhauer, gives 
him the key to h i s own existence, reveals to him the s i g -
n i f i c a n c e , shows him the inner mechanism of h i s being, of 
8 
h i s a c t i o n , of h i s movements. Every true act of the w i l l 
i s a movement of the body. They are not d i f f e r e n t things 
standing i n the r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t . They are one 
and the same thing. The action of the body i s the w i l l 
o b j e c t i f i e d . In f a c t , the whold body i s nothing but object-
i f i e d w i l l , the w i l l become idea. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between the body and w i l l a r i s e s from 
the difference i n the method of conceiving t h e i r inner and 
outer natures. The muscular a c t i v i t y of the body would be the 
sensuous appearance of the w i l l , not i t s e f f e c t . W i l l then i s 
not only i d e n t i c a l with the bra,in, with the muscles, but also 
with that power which formed the brain and muscles from the • 
blood; not only that, but i d e n t i c a l with the force forming 
the blood with i t s corpuscles. With t h i s the w i l l i s v a s t l y 
extended. I t becomes i d e n t i c a l with natural force, indeed, 
a l l the natural forces are merely p a r t i c u l a r appearances of 
w i l l running through the whole of nature. 
The knowledge which I have of my w i l l cannot be separated 
(6) 
from my "body. "I know my w i l l not as a whole, not as a 
u n i t y , not completely, according to i t s nature, hut I know i t 
only i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r a c t s , and therefore i n time, which i s 
the form of the phenomenal aspect of my body, as of every 
object." I cannot imagine my w i l l apart from my body, 
therefore the body i s . a condition of the knowledge of my 
w i l l . The body and w i l l are one. what as an idea of perception 
I c a l l my body, I c a l l w i l l , so f a r as t h i s body appears to 
me i n another way e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from idea. This double 
knowledge of our body affords us information about i t , i t s 
a c t i o n , movements f o l l o w i n g motives, and a l s o , i t s experiences 
from outside impressions. And so the p r i n c i p l e means of 
information comes not from the body as i d e a , but as more than 
idea, as what i t i s i n i t s e l f , as w i l l . The knowing subject 
becomes an i n d i v i d u a l j u s t by the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n to feme 
body. Apart from t h i s r e l a t i o n , h i s body f o r him i s only 
idea. 
The double knowledge of our own bodies i n t h e i r nature 
and a c t i v i t y both as idea and as w i l l i s made a b a s i s f o r 
judging a l l other objects i n nature outside of us. We judge 
these objects which are presented to our consciousness not 
i n a double way, but only as idea, l i k e our bodies, and i n 
t h i s respect are analogous to them. We assume that a,s i n 
one respect they are i d e a , l i k e our bodies, so i n another 
they are what remains when the idea of the subject i s cast 
(10) 
aside - the same as our own inner nature which we c a l l w i l l . 
For what other kind of existence or r e a l i t y can be a t t r i b u t e d 
to the remainder of the m a t e r i a l world? Outside of w i l l and 
idea nothing i s known to us, or even thinkable. O r d i n a r i l y 
when we speak of acts of the w i l l we r e f e r to those voluntary 
acts of body caused by motives. Yet these motives determine 
what I w i l l only for some p a r t i c u l a r time, for some p a r t i c u l a r 
p l a c e , under p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, not what I w i l l i n 
general. So, that v o l i t i o n i n general cannot be explained by 
the law of motivation, which determines nothing but i t s 
appearance at each point of time. I t i s only as an e m p i r i c a l 
character that motive i s a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r explanation 
of my ^ j t i o n . The p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason i s v a l i d 
f o r the manifestation of the w i l l , not f o r the w i l l i n i t s e l f 
which i s groundless, that i s , i t i s wholly unexplainable 
on any ground outside of i t s own nature. 
This w i l l i s recognized as the .inner essence not only 
of those phenomenal existences i n men and animals, but i t i s 
also recognized i n the "force which germinates and vegetates 
i n the p l a n t , and indeed the force through which the c r y s t a l 
i s formed, that by which the magnet turns to the north p o l e , 
the force whose shock he experiences from the contact of two 
d i f f e r e n t kinds of metals, the force which appears i n the 
e l e c t i v e a f f i n i t i e s of matter as r e p u l s i o n and a t t r a c t i o n , 
decomposition and combination, and l a s t l y , even g r a v i t a t i o n 
(11) 
which acts so powerfully throughout matter, draws the stone 
to the earth and the earth to the sun,- a l l these, w i l l be 
recognized as d i f f e r e n t only i n t h e i r phenomenal existence, 
but i n t h e i r inner nature as i d e n t i c a l , and i n i t s most 
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d i s t i n c t manifestation as, W i l l . " We no longer stop at the 
phenomenon, but are l e d to the t h i n g i n i t s e l f . A l l i d e a , 
a l l object i s phenomenal existence, the w i l l alone i s the 
t h i n g i t s e l f . I t i s that of which a l l i d e a , a l l object, i s 
the phenomenal existence, the v i s i b i l i t y , the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . 
As i t i s of the whole of existence, so i t i s of every p a r t i c -
u l a r t h i n g , the inmost nature, the k e r n e l . In the progress 
of the w i l l from i t s purely elementary to the c l e a r l y con-
scious form, i t e x h i b i t s a s e r i e s of stages i n i t s object-
i f i c a t i o n . In i t s lowest stage i t appears as purely mechan-
i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n , cause and e f f e c t having much the same 
nature and t h e i r r e l a t i o n being immediately perceptable. 
But i n the more s p e c i a l i z e d forces of nature ( g r a v i t y , 
e l e c t r i c i t y , heat and etc.) the r e l a t i o n i s apparent owing 
to the l e s s s i m i l a r i t y between cause and e f f e c t . However i n 
t h i s low stage, t h i s b l i n d force or tendency i s not known 
immediately as w i l l . 
In the organic relm of nature w i l l appears as an im-
p u l s e , a stimulus. In t h i s sphere the e f f e c t contains more 
than the cause. A small increase of the stimulus may cause 
a very great increase of the e f f e c t , or conversely, i t may 
(12) 
eliminate the previous effect altogether. Such are the effects 
upon a l l organized bodies. A l l organic and vegetative changes 
of the animal body must be referred to s t i m u l i . Not only 
i s t h i s true of animals, but i t also holds i n plants whose 
movements follow upon s t i m u l i . So that both animals and plants 
both i n t h e i r actions and also i n t h e i r whole existence, 
bodily structure, and organization are manifestations of w i l l . 
In the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of the w i l l man forms the highest 
stage. In the conscious being cause becomes motive, only to 
reveal i t s e l f upon r e f l e c t i o n and s e l f observation to be i n 
i t s inner nature, w i l l . The w i l l whether i n i t s lowest or 
highest form i s ever s t r i v i n g after the highest possible 
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , to appear as phenomenon, as object. This 
s t r i v i n g , longing, w i l l i n g to be something else, i s i d e n t i c a l 
with .the impulse to existence. For i t i s the essence of w i l l 
to s t r i v e ; i t i s a power incessently struggling to l i v e , 
to give i t s e l f manifestation. Thus resul t s the i n f i n i t e 
v a r i e t y of forms i n nature. Each form becomes a l i m i t which 
i s constantly overcome. The unity and inner relationship 
of the whole of nature i s revealed i n the common w i l l p r i n -
c i p l e which moves through and controls a l l things. The 
m u l t i p l i c i t y and v a r i e t y i n nature i s shown by the constant 
tendency to r e s i s t and overcome a l l l i m i t s i n the stages of 
development. There i s a constant struggle going on among the 
forms of nature for the mastery. Every grade of the object-
(IS) 
i f i c a t i o n of w i l l f i g h t s for the matter, the space, and the 
time of the others. 
Matter constantly changes i t s form; for mechanical 
p h y s i c a l , chemical, and organic phenomena, guided "by c a u s a l i t y 
eagerly s t r i v i n g to manifest themselves, wrest the matter 
from each other, f o r each i s eager to reveal i t s own idea. 
So goes the s t r i f e through the whole of nature"; indeed, only 
through struggle does nature e x i s t . Yet t h i s s t r i f e reveals 
the e s s e n t i a l variance of the w i l l with i t s e l f . This u n i v e r s a l 
c o n f l i c t i s "best seen i n the relms of the vegetable and 
animal kingdoms. The animal kingdom l i v e s upon the vegetable. 
And even w i t h i n the animal kingdom i t s e l f , every animal 
becomes the prey of every other animal. Each maintains i t s e l f 
at the p r i c e of the l i f e of some other creature. Thus the w i l l 
to e x i s t , to l i v e , preys upon i t s e l f , and becomes i t s own 
nourishment, t i l l , f i n a l l y , the human race, because i t sub-
dues a l l others, regards nature as a manufactory for i t s own 
use. But even i n the human race i s revealed the t e r r i b l e 
d i s t i n c t n e s s t h i s c o n f l i c t , t h i s mutual destruction, t h i s 
variance of the w i l l with i t s e l f . 
Out of t h i s constant struggle for existence there a r i s e s 
grades of the w i l l ' s o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . That knowledge of the 
understanding posessed by brutes to which the senses supply 
the data, out of which there a r i s e s mere perception confined 
to what i s immediately present, i s not s u f f i c i e n t . That 
Hi) 
complicated, many-sided, imaginative "being, man, with h i s 
many needs, and exposed as he i s to innumerable dangers, 
must, i n order to e x i s t , be l i g h t e d by double knowledge; a 
higner power of perceptive knowledge must be given him_, and 
also reason, as the f a c u l t y f o r framing of abstract concep-
t 11 t i o n s . 
From t h i s comes r e f l e c t i o n and d e l i b e r a t i o n . Action 
independent of the present i s p o s s i b l e , and f i n a l l y the f u l l 
and d i s t i n c t consciousness of ones own deliberate v o l i t i o n . 
Knowledge, generally, r a t i o n a l as w e l l as sensuous, proceeds 
o r i g i n a l l y from the w i l l i t s e l f , and i s subordinate to i t . 
h erein does Schopenhauer's philosophy d i f f e r from many others 
i n that i t makes i n t e l l e c t secondary to w i l l . I n t e l l i g e n c e 
i s fashioned by the w i l l and completely subordinate to i t . 
The world of knowledge i s a dream, i n d i v i d u a l i t y a chimera 
of the imagination. Nothing i s permanent but the w i l l and 
ideas. 
But since the essence of w i l l i s a c t i v i t y , s t r i v i n g , 
the question a r i s e s what i s the object, the f i n a l end of t h i s 
t h i n g i n i t s s e l f , of the world? while the phenomena may have 
a ground of s u f f i c i e n t reason, y e t , f o r the w i l l i t s e l f , f o r 
the idea i n which i t adequately o b j e c t i f i e s i t s e l f no ground 
can be given. Every p a r t i c u l a r act of w i l l of a knowing i n -
d i v i d u a l , who i s only a manifestation of w i l l as the t h i n g 
i n i t s e l f , has from necessity a motive without which the act 
. (lS) 
would never have occurred; "but j u s t as material cause contains 
merely the determination that at h i s time, i n t h i s place, 
and i n t h i s matter a manifestation of t h i s natural force 
must tke place, so the motive determines only the act of w i l l 
of a knowing being, at t h i s time, i n t h i s place, and under 
these circumstances, as a p a r t i c u l a r act, but by no means 
determines what that being w i l l s i n general, or w i l l s i n 
t h i s manner. This i s the expression of h i s i n t e l l i g i b l e 
character, which as w i l l i n i t s s e l f , the thing i n i t s s e l f , 
is,without ground, for i t l i e s outside the province of the 
p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason. So that freedom from a l l aim, 
from a l l l i m i t s , belongs to the nature of the w i l l , which i s 
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an endless s t r i v i n g . 
E t e r n al becoming, endless f l u x , characterizes the rev-
e l a t i o n of the inner nature of the w i l l . So human e f f o r t s 
and desires c o n t i n u a l l y elude us by presenting t h e i r s a t i s -
f a c t i o n s as the f i n a l end of w i l l , only to become uninterest-
ing upon posession, and to be soon forgotten. Says Schopen-
hauer, we are fortunate enough i f there s t i l l remains some-
thing to wish for and to s t r i v e a f t e r , that the game may be 
kept up of constant t r a n s i t i o n from desire to s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
and from s a t i s f a c t i o n to a new desire, the r a p i d course of 
which i s c a l l e d happiness, and the slow course sorrow, and 
does not sink i n t o that stagnation that shows i t s e l f i n f e a r -
f u l ennui that paralyzes l i f e , v a i n yearning without d e f i n i t e 
(lfi) 
15 object, deadening languor. Thus every p a r t i c u l a r act of 
w i l l has i t s end, the general w i l l has none; i t i s the t h i n g 
i t s e l f , which i s groundless. 
while i t i s true that the world of i n t e l l i g e n c e i s a 
dream, and i n d i v i d u a l i t y a chimera of the imagination, yet 
under c e r t a i n circumstances i t i s possible for the i n t e l l e c t 
to escape from subserviency to the w i l l , become a pure 
w i l l - l e s s i n t e l l i g e n c e , r i s i n g above the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the 
law of reason and dwelling i n the pure contemplation of the 
object i t s e l f . As we f i x our attention s o l e l y upon some 
object, l o s i n g ourselves completely i n i t s contemplation, 
our consciousness becomes so absorbed i n the external object, 
that we grasp the object e n t i r e l y apart from i t s ordinary 
r e l a t i o n s , thus fr e e i n g the subject from i t s subserviency 
to the w i l l . This says Schopenhauer, i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a r t ; 
and e s p e c i a l l y of music. In i t there i s that peculiar absorb-
t i o n i n the thing contemplated, that remarkable unconscious-
ness which sets free the subject, and has always been consider-
ed the r e a l index of the a r t i s t i c genius. This power of 
contemplation which i s free from causality and w i l l , and 
i s the assence of the aesthetic l i f e , belongs not to the 
many, but to the few. With the many, i n t e l l e c t remains a 
prisoner i n the service of the w i l l to l i v e , of se l f - p r e s e r -
v a t i o n and of personal i n t e r e s t . I t i s but seldom, and only 
i n the a r t i s t i c and p h i l o s o p h i c a l genius, that the i n t e l l e c t 
(17) 
Succeeds i n freeing i t s e l f from the supremacy of the w i l l , 
and, l a y i n g aside the question of the why and the wherefore, 
the where and the when, i n sinking i t s e l f completely i n the 
pure What of things. I t i s only with the g i f t e d , the thinker 
and the a r t i s $ , t h a t i n t e l l e c t looking beyond the i n d i v i d u a l , 
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becomes pure, timeless subject, freed from the w i l l . 
But a r t even to the man of i n s i g h t , of genius, can 
a f f o r d only temporary consolation. I t i s but momentary, 
never complete, never absolute. True existence, true s a t i s -
f a c t i o n , true r e a l i t y , belongs only to the u n i v e r s a l , to 
the aimless w i l l , constantly s t r i v i n g to r e a l i z e i t s e l f . 
A metaphysical p r i n c i p l e , i f t r u l y comprehensive, must 
always give the s o l u t i o n of the e t h i c a l problem of existence. 
What i s man's place and funct i o n i n t h i s world? What has he 
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to do i n t h i s l i f e , and what hope has he of a l i f e beyond? 
The i n d i v i d u a l l i f e i s t r a n s i t o r y . True existence i s 
posessed only by the u n i v e r s a l , which i s the aimless w i l l 
ever s t r u g g l i n g to manifest i t s e l f . The inner being of 
unconscious nature i s a constant s t r i v i n g without end and 
without r e s t . This r e a l i t y i s e t e r n a l , f o r b i r t h and death 
belong only to the phenomenal. Our present existence i s but 
an in c i d e n t i n the long l i f e , a dream from which i t i s 
awakened by death. Said H e r a c l i t u s ; "While we l i v e our 
souls are dead w i t h i n us, but when we d i e , we are restored 
to l i f e . In our l i f e are both l i v i n g and dying. We l i v e the 
OS) 
death of the Gods and die t h e i r l i f e " Even f o r t h i s l i f e of 
man there is- nothing permanent, a l l i s t r a n s i t o r y , The 
present i s "but a f l e e t i n g show between two u n r e a l i t i e s . 
Only the thing i n i t s e l f , the w i l l , l i v e s on forever, i s 
e t e r n a l . The i n d i v i d u a l as a delusion disappears, passes 
i n t o nothingness, only the u n i v e r s a l i s immortal. L i f e , 
instead of being a source of happiness, i s a constant burden. 
I t i s a constant struggle f o r t h i s existence withe the 
c e r t a i n t y of l o s i n g i t i n the end. L i f e i t s e l f i s a sea f u l l 
of rocks and w h i r l p o o l s , which man avoids with the greatest 
care and s o l i c i t u d e , only to f a l l i n the end i n the t o t a l , 
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i n e v i t a b l e , and irremediable shipwreck, death. Existence 
i s a miserable sham. The world i s f u l l of suffering; indeed, 
i t i s the worst of a l l p o ssible worlds. Man i n h i s consta nt 
struggles as a part of t h i s great w i l l i s i n continual s t r i f e 
with a l l h i s f e l l o w s . His constant s t r i v i n g s spring from 
want, from d i s a t i s f a c t i o n , from s u f f e r i n g . This desire i s 
never s a t i s f i e d . Misery i s the r e s u l t , and i s e t e r n a l . 
Pleasure i s an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Man i s an accumulation of 
inumerable wants, which are but temporarly s a t i s f i e d . The 
misery of existence f a r out weighs the happiness. L i f e i s 
not worth l i v i n g . 
I t i s only when man r e a l i z e s h i s l i f e and that of h i s 
fellow s with whom he i s i n constant struggle, r e s t i n a 
common w i l l that the a f f i r m a t i o n of the w i l l to l i v e takes 
(16) 
the form of sympathy, of f e l l o w f e e l i n g , from which come 
love and a l l e t h i c a l a c t i o n . Human love .in p a r t i c u l a r im-
p l i e s the knowledge of the oneness, the unity of a l l men. 
But even i n t h i s newly discovered bond of sympathy there i s 
no r e a l r e l i e f from t h i s l i f e of misery, f o r i t means a 
continuance of t h i s wretched existence. His v i s i o n i s s t i l l 
dimmed by ignorance of the worthlessness of a l l things. The 
v e i l of Maya clouds h i s sight. But when i t i s l i f t e d and 
he r e a l i z e s that a l l beings are part of h i s own inner, true 
s e l f , and that the pangs of the whold world, and of the 
i n f i n i t e number of beings w i t h i n i t must be shared by him, 
he cares not f o r l i f e . Prom every d i r e c t i o n constant s u f f e r -
i n g , c o n t r a d i c t i o n , and agonized creation presses upon him. 
From t h i s no a f f i r m a t i o n of the w i l l affords any means of 
escape. Only absolute quiescence by complete resignation of 
the w i l l w i l l b r i ng contentment. Deny the w i l l to l i v e . Be-
come absorbed i n t o Nirvana. Here the i n t e l l e c t escapes sub-
serviency to the w i l l , and becomes i t s master. Complete 
w i l l - l e s s - n e s s i s the only s a l v a t i o n f o r the race. Only 
s u f f e r i n g which brings about resi g n a t i o n i s worthy of rever-
ence. 
Suicide i s not i n harmony with t h i s resignation of l i f e , 
f o r i n s t e a d of being a denial of the w i l l , i t i s a strong 
a s s e r t i o n of the w i l l . Suicide i s s e l f i s h , f o r i t ignores 
humanity; i t i s useless, since the t e r r o r s of a new existence 
confront the i n d i v i d u a l . The essence of negation consists 
i n t h i s , that the joys of l i f e are shunned, not i t s sorrows. 
The suicide w i l l s l i f e , being only d i s s a t i s f i e d with"the 
present condition of'things. He w i l l s l i f e i n a d i f f e r e n t 
form, a more un r e s t r i c t e d existence. The goal of human l i f e 
i s the destruction of l i f e , and- the t o t a l absorption of the 
i n d i v i d u a l l i f e i n t o the source of a l l l i f e , the great world 
w i l l , the u n i v e r s a l so u l , the A l l . 
The complete sugjugation of the w i l l by the i n t e l l e c t i s 
attained. The evolver has been suppressed by the evolved. 
But what can be said of the value of t h i s doctrine of 
Schopenhauer'as a basis of existence? Does i t answer s a t i s -
f a c t o r y the fundamental questions of philosophy? As to what 
re s t s at the foundation of phenomena, what i s to be regarded 
as the substance of the world, Thought, I n t e l l i g e n c e , Mind, 
or b l i n d unconscious Force? I t i s upon t h i s question that the 
ultimate d i s t i n c t i o n of philosophy depends. Fawcett pro-
nounces the system of Schopenhauer to be the most sparkling 
product of German philosophy. But Schopenhauer impresses us 
as being stronger as a c r i t i c than as a constructive meta-
phycian. His theory i s inadequate and l a r g e l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
His world theory i s as inconsistent with i t s e l f as h i s 
p e r s o n a l i t y was s e l f w i l l e d and unharmonious. "He c a r r i e s 
i n t o h i s system a l l the contradictions and whims of h i s 
capricious nature, says Z e l l e r . He i s inconsistent and 
(21) 
i l l o g i c a l , and assumes e n t i r e l y too much i n h i s course of 
reasoning. 
He s t a r t s out with the world as idea, as presentation, 
( the most r a d i c a l idealism ), and "befor he closes, he has 
landed i n the rankest materialism. Thought, knowledge, i s 
a product of the "brain. Idealism regards the b r a i n as only 
a phenomenal object i n an i l l u s o r y phenomenal world; but now 
we have thought as merely a material phenomenon. I f the b r a i n 
e x i s t s only f o r perception, how can i t manifest perception 
as i t s function, says Fawcett? When Schopenhauer says, "The 
world i s my presentation", one i s i n c l i n e d to ask, presentat-
ion of what? He says again, "The world i s my w i l l " . The w i l l 
i s a t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f but the thing i n i t s e l f i s also phenom-
enon. The universe i s i t s presentation. Either the t h i n g 
i n i t s e l f i s presented, or i t i s not presented. I f presented, 
i t ceases to be the thing i n i t s e l f . I f not presented, i t 
cannot be known. Hence, r e s u l t s a f a t a l paradox. 
One n o t i c i b l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Schopenhauer's theory i s 
found i n h i s a r b i t r a r y assertions. He says,the body i s the 
o b j e E t i f i c a t i o n of the w i l l , the v a l i d reasons he has f o r 
asserting the i d e n t i t y of the w i l l and the body do not appear. 
In f a c t , he claims none. He merely makes the statement which 
must be taken for granted. The only foundation f o r the theory 
of W i l l as the thing i n i t s e l f , i s i n the knowledge that we 
posess of our own w i l l . Admitting that we do have some con-
sciousness of ourselves as w i l l i n g , we s t i l l ask whether 
(&S) 
t h i s i s a knowledge of the thing i t s e l f . Says Schopefchauer, 
the knowledge I have of ray w i l l , though immediate, cannot 
from 
be separated that which I have of my body. I know ray w i l l not 
as a whole, not as a u n i t y , not completely, according to i t s ' 
nature,, but I know i t only i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r acts, and there-
fore i n time, which i s the form of the phenomenal aspect of 
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my body , as of every body. Prom t h i s i t does not fo l l o w 
that a knowledge of my own w i l l implies a knowledge of the 
W i l l i n i t s e l f . I am not conscious of the w i l l i n i t s e l f , but 
of my own w i l l . Schopenhauer says, I know the subject w i l l -
i n g . The cognitive subject has knowledge of the subject of 
w i l l . Adamson asks the question, are these two subjects the 
same? Schopenhauer ought to answer that they are not the 
same;for he has repeatedly said, the subject cannot know 
i t s e l f . But h i s answer i s that they are the same. The i d e n t i t y 
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of the two subjects i s a miracle not to be explained. One 
f e e l s that there are too many such miracles i n Schopenhauer's 
philosophy to make a very coherent system. 
Again, Schopenhauer has to face the problem which every 
philosophy of the universe has to solve, that evolves i t from 
b l i n d f o r c e , what i s the r e l a t i o n between b l i n d force and 
conscious thought. In thinki n g things there are d e f i n i t e 
thought r e l a t i o n s between the things thought and the subject 
t h i n k i n g . Furthermore, t h i s thinking occurs i n forms of 
space, time, and c a u s a l i t y . 
(&0 
But the w i l l as a thing i t s e l f l i e s outside of and beyond 
these, which are forms of subjective t h i n k i n g , and come i n t o 
existence only upon formation of the br a i n . I t can have no 
I n d i v i d u a l i t y , no end fo r i t s e f f o r t . Besides, i s i t p o s s i b l e 
to conceive of the evolution of t h i s universe of beings from 
a b l i n d force, which i s blank and la c k i n g i n a l l those q u a l i t -
ies, p e c u l i a r to thought alone. In a l l such attempts to con-
struct a world of beings capable of thought, of i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
i n however small degree, one f e e l s that i n some way there has 
been i n j e c t e d into t h i s blank substance, force, or what not, 
some of these thought forms necessary t o , and thought r e l a -
t i o n s necessary f o r conscious existence. This d i f f i c u l t y as 
i n most other problems i n Schopenhauer's theory i s s e t t l e d 
by a mere a r b i t r a r y assertion. I t i s a f a c t and that ends i t # 
Those who reject i t ought to be sent to a mad house where i t 
i s to be hoped t h e i r f o l l y w i l l be cured. 
In the t h i r d and fourth books of World as W i l l and Idea, 
there i s a marked contradiction to the f i r s t and second 
books, which stand i n contradiction to each other. In the 
beginning we were t o l d that the world of presentation was 
subject to the p r i n c i p l e of s u f f i c i e n t reason. But i n the 
t h i r d and fourth books we are informed that outside and be-
yond causal cognition there are the la r g e r forms of aesthet-
i c a l and ph i l o s o p h i c a l i n t u i t i o n . At f i r s t the i n t e l l e c t was 
the creature of the w i l l , and sojrsubordinate to i t , but l a t e r 
i t not only frees i t s e l f from the power of the w i l l , but I n 
turn overcomes and onnihilates the w i l l . How a l l t h i s i s 
accomplished i s not explained by Schopenhauer. 
No thinking person w i l l take h i s pessimism very seriously, 
indeed, one can scarce think that Schopenhauer took i t very 
s e r i o u s l y himself. In fact i t seems to have been more of a 
personal mood re s u l t i n g from h i s over sensitive and a r b i -
t r a r y nature, which often took offense at h i s more popular 
contemporaries. For a pessimistic view of l i f e i s c e r t a i n l y 
not i n harmony with h i s theory of the W i l l i n i t s e l f , since 
i t i s the absolute, the A l l . And, how can the absolute, the 
A l l want anything, crave anything. I t i s t h i s undying, never-
satisfied want that l i e s at the basis of pessimism. But, 
that which has a l l within i t s e l f can want nothing; And every-
t h i n g , every being i s a part of t h i s A l l . Want Implies a 
longing for something outside one's s e l f , but what can be 
outside the absolute? 
Pessimism i s also inconsistent with h i s theory from 
another standpoint. It i s upon the e t e r n a l i t y of the w i l l 
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that pessimism mast r e s t , IS at a l l . But when Schopenhauer 
i n the fourth book brings the w i l l not only i n subordination 
to the i n t e l l e c t , but destroys i t , he removes the foundation 
for pessimism. 
In conclusion, one i s l e d to say that Schopenhauer's 
system or philosophy failed to f u l f i l l the claims of himself 
and of his adherents; yet, i t i s an attempt to reconcile 
(25) 
the two apparently opposed forces i n nature by the discovery 
of the one p r i n c i p l e which l i e s at the basis of both, the 
"one i d e n t i t y which contains w i t h i n i t s e l f the power of 
development i n t o the d i f f e r e n t and manifold." 
The reader i s not convinced that Schopenhauer has ar-
r i v e d at a well-grounded p r i n c i p l e . I t impresses him with I t s 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and paradox. An a l l - p o w e r f u l 
W i l l evolving from i t s e l f a l l forms of existence only to 
reabsorb them Into i t s own nothingness i s too much fo r the 
thoughtful mind. I t approaches the improbable. Schopenhauer's 
philosophy has been characterized, not inappropriately 
as a clever novel, which entertains the reader by I t s r a p i d 
4 
v i c i s s i t u d e s . 
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